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Force Engagement studies

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A.21.R - FUTURE SOLDIER (SOLDIER MODERNISATION)

TACTICAL (DOCTRINE RELATED) CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUTURE SOLDIER (SOLDIER MODERNISATION) PROGRAMME futuresoldier
Instability, unpredictability and diversity will be the characteristics of the future security situation. In contrast to the smaller risk of large scale armed conflicts, FINABEL countries now face a greater likelihood of small scale, national or regional conflicts. So each FINABEL country set up different programs in order to implement the future soldiers capability.
These programs share common views on future scenarios, battlefield and same basis on future tasks. They are different on the ground of material, procurement timeline and budgets. This Study analyzes different national programs and studies and figures out the tactical consequences that such programs will lead to.

F.28.R - THE EMPLOYMENT OF SURFACE-TO-AIR ARTILLERY IN URBAN AREAS

Aim of the study: requirements to be met by GBAD units during an employment in urban areas based on an analysis of the foreseeable threat in urban areas and the identification of the conditions to be met for detecting and engaging air warfare assets in urban areas.

After analysing the characteristics of the urban area, the threat, the mission and the required capabilities of GBAD in order to operate efficiently in urban areas, the following conclusions and recommendations are formulated.

K.26.R - REQUIREMENTS OF HELICOPTER FORCES FOR CARRYING OUT AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

REQUIREMENTS OF HELICOPTER FORCES FOR CARRYING OUT AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE ARMED FORCES’ C3I SYSTEMS

Current lessons learned and projections indicate that the ability to share information between military systems will be a crucial factor for success when conducting future combined arms and joint operations in a multinational (coalition and/or allied) environment.The rapidly changing nature and location of military employments has necessitated an equally rapid transformation in C3I Systems.

Interoperability is a fundamental pre-condition for appropriate information exchange. Poor interoperability must not hamper the operational and tactical efficiency of helicopter forces. Future Army aviation information systems will therefore need to interoperate with one another more effectively than ever before.

The aim of this study is to define and assess the Information Exchange Requirements (IER) for the use of helicopters in multinational and joint operations in order to improve their operational effectiveness.

Based on NATO Policy and Directives for C3 Systems Interoperability it is imperative to implement the operational Interoperability Exchange Requirements in order to maintain and enhance the advantages of helicopter forces with respect to time and distance 

F.27.R - THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIRE SUPPORT IN URBAN AREAS

Urban areas are categorised as complex terrain, which imposes specific challenges to all forces in executing their combat missions. This is also the case for fire support. The employment of indirect fire means in support of MOUT poses additional challenges to their use in operations unconstrained by complex terrain

K.25.R - THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS IN BUILT-UP AREAS

THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS IN BUILT-UP AREAS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THEIR CAPABILITIES

Like for all other Army components, the urban areas remain extremely hostile to airmobile units. They can however develop the specific know-how and equipment which will enable them to conduct or participate in a large range of combat actions.

The major constraints for them are: navigation, vulnerability, the nature of their weapons in terms of effectiveness and the risk of collateral damage.

Their essential advantages are: their capability not to be disturbed by the obstacles in order to observe and engage from all directions, their capability to carry out both combat, combat support and combat service support missions, their capability to permit a rapid step-up of efforts, their capability to switch from one course of action to the other.

Consequently, the optimisation of their employment will require the development of orientation and protection assets as well as of accurate weapon systems with variable power.

Their engagement however also implies strict co-ordination measures and intensive training. 

A.20.R - MECHANISED UNITS COMBAT IN URBAN AREA.

Mechanised units have advantages in this combat framework (armour, mobility, fire power and precision etc.), especially if the adversary is weak in anti-armour capability.
Each city has its own particular characteristics. The various threats (ambushes, population...) and vulnerabilities (difficulties of mutual support, reduced field of vision, etc) will always have to be taken into account in deciding upon the best form of organisation.
In violence control operations, intelligence, albeit decentralised, will play an important role during both planning and operational stages. In the reconstruction phase, intelligence is the key military capability.
International law and LOAC will be critical and proper constraints due to the presence of a civilian population, which may well prove to be an additional factor when operating in this type of environment.
ROE's will need to be thorough and detailed in their conceptualisation and that all soldiers will be obliged to observe them at all times. They should, however, be sufficiently clear and simple to permit swift and decisive implementation by the most junior soldier.


A.19.R PROTECTION OF FORCES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FINABEL INTERVENTION UNDER MULTINATIONAL COMMAND

Security of the force is a constant concern for the commander of any operation. All military activities relating to the preparation, projection, employment or withdrawal of a military force always have an underlying security component aimed at ensuring that the commander has the prevention, warning and response capabilities to counter possible threats against the units under his command. The recent events (as prime example the terrorist attack of September 11th 2001) in the modern operational environment have shown the diversity of the threats and the changing nature of conflict (intensity, location, ways of engagement, opponents, etc.) This group of new elements (asymmetry, non-linearity) has imposed several deep changes in the composition and action of the forces engaged (multinational projected forces, etc ) to counter these new threats. Asymmetry, non linearity, multinational character, joint action, as well as the concern to limit "human losses" are new factors that increase the complexity of the operational environment and consequently the constant wish of the commander for the protection and safety of the forces under his command.

K.24.R - THE AIRMOBILE UNITS’ 3D COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS

THE AIRMOBILE UNITS’ 3D COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF DEEP OPERATIONS

To establish the airspace control and coordination measures required for deep airmobile operations.

F.26.R - THE ENGAGEMENT OF LOW RCS - RADAR CROSS SECTION -TARGETS

THE ENGAGEMENT OF LOW RCS -  RADAR CROSS SECTION -TARGETS (CRUISE MISSILES, STAND-OFF MISSILES AND UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES) BY THE FUTURE SURFACE-TO-AIR VSHORAD AND SHORAD SYSTEMS IN THE POST 2015 TIMEFRAME

The development of stand-off surface-to-air missiles will increasingly enable aircraft to engage their targets whilst staying out of the area of action of SHORAD and VSHORAD systems.

Besides, UAVs that are increasingly effective in carrying out their reconnaissance, target acquisition or even combat missions constitute an increasing threat.

Similarly, cruise missiles are becoming more accurate, more manoeuvrable and more difficult to detect. In the future, their numbers will increase because of production cost reductions resulting from technological advances.

In addition the threat of irregular forces using low RCS assets such as UAVs is increasing.

Surface-to-air defence assets must therefore be ready, in addition of their conventional aircraft and helicopter enemy, to engage these new threats which may be characterised by their small size, fast speed, low level flying capabilities and very low RCS.

This study identifies the main capabilities needed to deal with these threats in the post-2015 timeframe.

The study does not take account of the ballistic threat or large calibre rockets.

The main recommendations of the study are as follows :

- changes in sensors,

- changes in firing platforms,

- changes in BMC4I,

- intensification of the modular approach.

Taking all these elements into account will make it possible to counter the threat of low RCS targets 

F.25.R - THE ROLE OF FORWARD OBSERVERS IN FUTURE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS

The forward observer (FO) must be able to be involved in the complete range of operations. Within this framework, the forward observers' missions will take place in close, deep and rear operations. But in the future, other operations will become  the norm, violence control operations and operations in specific environments. The tasks that the forward observer must carry out in the future will be the conventional ones, with the addition of others for which he will have to be trained. In the future, the forward observer will have to have a multirole capability in order to deal with future operations. Technological developments will have an impact on all the forward observer's missions. New communications technologies will allow more centralised control of a greater number of forward observers.
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